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In every serious financial period in the history of this coun-
try,2 there has been a legislative recognition of the imperative
need for reliefs for the debtor class. Roughly, the relief afforded
can be placed in four classifications.
I. In some states reliance has been placed on the inherent power
of a court of equity to alter its usual procedure in the foreclosure
of mortgages in order to give relief to the mortgagor-debtor and at
the same time to protect the interests of the mortgagee-creditor.
II. In some states, statutes substituting as the only method of
foreclosure of mortgages, foreclosure by action for foreclosure by
advertisement have been the palliative offered. 4
I The material presented in the following articles and comments
has been freely used: BAR=iLEY, "Constitutional Law-Impairment of
Contracts-Moratorium," 13 Ore. L. Rev. 156 (1934) BuNx, "Impair-
ment of Contracts-Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria," 1 Univ. of Chi.
L. Rev. 249 (1933) CHEAiBERLAIN, "Legislatures and Relief of Debtors,"
19 A. B. A. 3. 474 (1933) Conwin, "Moratorium Over Minnesota," 82
Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1934) FEILER, "Emergency Mortgage Redemp-
tion Extension Legislation," 9 Wis. L. Rev. 92 (1933) FELER, "Moratory
Legislation; A Comparative Study," 46 Harvard L. Rev. 1061 (1933)
HEFFEBmAN, "Minnesota Mor.tgage Moratorium Case," 9 Ind. L. Rev. 337
(1934) Kipp, "Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium Statutes," 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 71 (1933) STEDMAN, "Emergency Extension of Mortgage Redemp-
tion Period in Wisconsin," 8 Wis. L. Rev. 174 (1933) WinENE, "A Mort-
gage Foreclosure Moratorium," 27 Illinois L. Rev. 799 (1933) "Moratory
Legislation for Relief of Mortgagors," 18 Mlinn. L. Rev. 319 (1933)
"Constitutionality of Mortgage Relief Legislation," 47 Harvard L. Rev.
660 (1934).
'See FELLER, "Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study," 46 Har-
vard L. Rev. 1061, in which is included a table complete to 1930 of the
various types of moratory relief enacted during other depressions.
"Relief legislation in some form has been adopted in: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshre, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin. In several other
states, including Washington, similar legislation was proposed.
'Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota.
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III. In some states, general "stay laws" have been adopted
(a) blanket extensions of the redemption period;'
(b) discretionary extensions of the period of redemption;6
(c) blanket postponement of sale ;7
(d) discretionary postponement of sale;8
(e) delay in proceedings, including dilatory pleadings,9
continuances,10 delay of trial or judgment,"' suspension of
period of foreclosure.' 2
IV In some states, statutes relating to the deficiency judgment
have been adopted
(a) abolition of deficiency judgments;"
(b) suspension of deficiency judgments ;14
(c) regulation of the amount of the deficiency judgment,
i.e by the fixing of an upset or minimum price at which the
property must be bid in at the foreclosure sale, if the sale is
to be confirmed by the court, or by fixing the reasonable
value of the property to the amount deducted from the princi-
pal sum due in order to determine the deficiency still to be
paid by the debtor rather than using the amount bid at the
foreclosure sale. 15
Already, cases involving the various types of statute have come
before the courts for adjudication. In Surmng State Bank v. Giese"
the first type of moratory relief was considered. While this opin-
ion seems contrary to the decisions of many cases which hold that
mere inadequacy of price, however gross, unaccompanied by fraud,
unfairness, or other inequitable conduct, is insufficient to justify
the setting aside or the refusing to confirm a judicial sale,' 7 it
seems desirable in the light of the circumstances. The desirable
test should be "Is the sale under all circumstances one of which
the court in justice to all parties should approve 9" Where the fact
of an inadequate price is coupled with an emergency which oper-
uKansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
GIowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas, Ver-
mont.
Texas.
'Arkansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
'Arkansas, North Dakota, Oklahoma.
"OArizona, Iowa, Michigan, Oklahoma, Texas.
"North Dakota, Oklahoma.
'5Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, Oklahoma, Vermont.
=Arkansas, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota.
"Arizona, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Texas.
15 Arkansas, California, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, West
Virginia, Wisconsin.
"246 N. W 556, 85 A. L. R. 1477 (Wis. 1933) Noted in 8 Wis. L. Rev.
286.
IT Kinna'rd v. Farmers & Merchants' Bank, 249 Ky. 661, 61 S. W (2d)
291 (1933) Omaha Loan & Building Ass'n. v. Clarke, 250 N. W 748 (Neb.
1933) Federal Land Bank of St. Louts v. Floyd, 61 S. W (2d) 449 (Ark.
1933) Hill v. Campbell, 251 N. W 106 (Neb. 1933) Nebraska Commercial
Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Bradley, 251 N. W 174 (Neb. 1933).
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ates to prevent competent bidding, a court of equity is justified
in refusing to confrmn the sale and m ordering a resale.
Little need be said of the second type of statute because the
subject of mortgages is controlled by statute and there seems to
be no objection to the alteration of one of the methods of fore-
closure.
The most prevalent form of statutory regulation of mortgages
during the period of depression is that falling under group three
of the above classification. The North Dakota 8 and Minnesota'9
statutes, construed in State ex ret. Cleverznga v. Klein20 and Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. BlaisdetlP are the outstanding ex-
amples of this type of relief. The objections raised in both cases
were that the statutes, concededly different in certain respects,
were unconstitutional because they impaired the obligation of con-
tract, and in the case of the former statute, deprived the mort-
gagee of his property without due process of law The former
statute was declared to be unconstitutional, the latter constitu-
tional. The Klevn case is followed in two Texas cases declaring
invalid the Texas statute postponing the foreclosure of liens.
22
Two other Texas cases have followed the Bla sdelZ case.
23
The Idaho legislation 24 which attempted to achieve the same re-
sult by action of the Governor was considered in the case of Al-
liance Trust Co. v. Hall.25 This was an action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage due prior to the passage of the moratory statute
and prior to the Governor's proclamation suspending all real
estate mortgage foreclosures in the state. The defense set up by
'North Dakota Laws 1933, p. 226, ch. 157, sec. 2: "* * * That the
period within which a mortgagor or judgment debtor may redeem from
a mortgage foreclosure sale of real estate, but for which deed has not
been issued., is hereby extended for a period of 2 years * * *"
,,Minnesota Laws 1933, p. 514, ch. 339: "'* * * the period of redemption
may be extended for such additional time as the court may deem just
and equitable, but in no event beyond May 1, 1935, providing that the
mortgagor or the owner of the property in possession in the case of the
mortgage foreclosure proceedings, * shall prior to the time of redemp-
tion, apply -to the district court * * * for an order determining the
reasonable value of the income of said property * * * and directing and
requiring such mortgagor * * * to pay all or a reasonable part of such
income or rental value, in or towards the payment of taxes, insurance,
interest, mortgage * * * indebtedness * * *"
"249 N. W 118 (N. D. 1933).
54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 255 (1934)
Life Insurance Co. of Virginza v. Sanders, 62 S. W (2d) 348 (Texas
1933) Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W (2d) 404 (Texas 1933).
"'Russell v. Battle Creek Lumber Co., 252 N. W 561 (Mich. 1934)
State v. Waterfelf, 29 Pac. (2d) 24 (Okla. 1934) Lingo Lumber Co. v.
Hayes, 64 S. W (2d) 835 (Texas 1933) Beaumont Petroleum Syndicate
v. Broussard, 64 S. W (2d) 993 (Texas 1933).
"1 Idaho Laws 1933, p. 192, ch. 124, sec. 1. "* * * That the Governor
of the State of Idaho be and he is hereby authorized and. empowered,
whenever, in his opinion, extraordinary conditions exist justifying such
action, to declare legal holidays in addition to those now authorized by
law, and to limit such holidays to certain classes of business and activ-
ities to be designated by him, but no such holidays shall extend for a
longer period than 60 days, provided, however, that it may be renewed
for one or more periods not exceeding 60 days each, as the Governor
may deem necessary."
-'5 Fed. SuPD. 285 (1933).
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the mortgagor defendant was a plea in abatement and for the sus-
pension of the action for foreclosure because of the proclamation.
The court granted the foreclosure decree after holding that the
legislature which was prohibited from passing any law which
would impair the obligation of contract could not circumvent this
prohibition by delegating to the Governor such authority
The fourth group of statutes, and the group which seems to im-
pose the greatest hardship on the mortgagee and give the greatest
relief to the mortgagor because it is usually permanent relief and
not a mere postponement of the right to sue, is that relating to
deficiency judgments. It is with this type of statute, that the
State of Washington has had experience m the past when it was
felt necessary to aid mortgage debtors by some form of statutory
relief. Provision is made in the Washington statutes for the satis-
faction of the debt secured by a mortgage."' However, during the
financial depression of 1897 an attempt was made to abolish the
deficiency judgment. In the case of Dennis v Moses2 the statute
providing that in all proceedings for the foreclosure of mortgages
or in judgments rendered upon the debt secured thereby, the mort-
gagee or the assignee should be limited to the property included
in the mortgage was declared unconstitutional as contrary to public
policy, being an interference with the liberty to contract and an
undue restriction on the pledging of property to secure obliga-
tions. 28 The Dennis case has been used as an authority in several
cases declaring unconstitutional the deficiency judgment statutes
passed during the 1933 legislative sessions.29 Probably the leading
recent case on the subject is that of Adams v. Spll yards30 con-
struing the Arkansas statute.2 P, trustees, brought suit to fore-
close a trust deed form of mortgage without having complied with
the provisions of the Arkansas statute. D, mortgagor, plead the
statute in defense. The court held for P, arguing that the law
in force when and where the contract is made and is to be per
formed forms a part of the contract, the parties being conclusively
presumed to contract with reference to the existing law that the
mortgagor's personal liability for a deficiency after foreclosure
and sale is a part of the mortgage contract, and that the statute
"Wash. Rem. Comp. Stat. see. 1117 to 1123 incl.
2,18 Wash. 537, 52 Pac. 333 (1898).
In spite of this decision, or perhaps because of it, the court has
upheld clauses in mortgages limiting the rights of the mortgagee to the
property included in the mortgage. Weikel v. Dams, 109 Wash. 97, 186
Pac. 323 (1919) Exchange National Bank of Spokane v. Wolverton, 11
Wash. 108, 39 Pac. 248 (1895).
1Adams v. Spillyards, 61 S. W (2d) 686 Ark. (1933)
,ONote 29, supra.
31 "In any foreclosure in any court in the State of Arkansas in which
real property is involved, the real estate securing the loan sought to be
foreclosed shall be considered to be the value of the loan made, irrespee
tive of the amount which may be realized from the sale of such realty
* * * and when real property is sold under the foreclosure decree, said
sale shall not be confirmed by the court until and unless said court has
inquired into the amount that said property sold for, and hear testimony
thereon in order to ascertain whether or not the purchaser bid the fair
market value for said property and said sale shall not be confirmed until
after said hearing * * *"
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prohibiting the deficiency judgment is unconstitutional as an in-
pairment of the obligation of contract.
A subsequent Arkansas case, Wilson v. Fouke,82 considered an-
other section of the statute relating to the deficiency judgment and
held it constitutional. A debtor executed to the creditor bank a
trust deed to 8000 acres of land as security for a debt. The creditor
brought suit to foreclose the lien of the deed of trust. The decree
granted made provision for the sale of the property at an upset
price of $5 per acre. The trustee appealed from the decree on
the ground that the mode of sale was void as depriving -him of
his contractual right to subject the land to sale. The court, after
distinguishing the case of Adams v. Spstlyards, denied the appeal,
saying that although the form of sale was not m common use, it
was not prohibited m practice, because it did not deprive the
trustee of any interest, the trustee having no interest in the pro-
ceeds of the sale in excess of the debt.
The validity of similar statutes enacted in Nebraska and Michi-
gan has not been determined. In two Nebraska cases, Wallace v.
Clements3" and Incoln Safe Deposit Co. v. Carlson,8 4 the court
held that the problem of the constitutionality of the statute was
not property raised and so would not be considered. In Bleakley
v. Oakwayne Farms Co.35 the Michigan court said that the statute
of that jurisdiction regulating the foreclosure of real estate mort-
gages conferred no power on the court to set aside, alter or impair
the mortgage contract, fix and upset price on the mortgaged prem-
ises, appraise the mortgaged property, and direct the mortgagee
to credit on sale at least the appraised value of the property on
the debt, but if it had, the statute would have been invalid as a
violation of the federal and state constitutions.
The Minnesota provision as to the deficiency judgment has not
been before the court. It is suggested that the treatment accorded
the other provisions of the statute m the BlassdelZ case cannot be
considered as an indication of the treatment that would be ac-
corded a case raising the deficiency judgment section, in view of
the existing decisions in other jurisdictions on the subject.
The Wisconsin statute providing for the upset price is typical.
In the case of Hoeft v. Kuz 36 that statute, enacted after the
rendition of the decision in the case of Surng State Bank v. Giese,87
was held to impose upon the courts the mandatory duty of setting
a minimum price at which the property should be bid m at the
foreclosure sale some time before the sale.
Within the last few years, there have been several unsuccessful
attempts to enact some form of moratory relief legislation in Wash-
ington.3 8  MuuIRnm A. MAwni .
67 S. W (2d) 1030 (Ark. 1934)
"250 N. W 235 (Neb. 1933).
31250 N. W 236 (Neb. 1933).
251 N. W 354 (Mich. 1933).
"252 N. W 589 (Wis. 1934).
"Note 16, supra.
"House Bill No. 150, Extraordinary Session, Legislature of the State
of Washington, 1933: "* * * 1. No action for the foreclosure of a mortgage
upon real estate shall be commenced after the passage of this act until
March 15, 1935, in cases where the real estate mortgaged is occupied by
